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Abstract
Skepticism of the building block hypothesis (BBH) has previously
been expressed on account of the weak theoretical foundations of this
hypothesis and the anomalies in the empirical record of the simple ge-
netic algorithm. In this paper we hone in on a more fundamental cause
for skepticism—the extraordinary strength of some of the assumptions
that undergird the BBH. Specifically, we focus on assumptions made
about the distribution of fitness over the genome set, and argue that
these assumptions are unacceptably strong. As most of these assump-
tions have been embraced by the designers of so-called “competent”
genetic algorithms, our critique is relevant to an appraisal of such al-
gorithms as well.
Keywords: genetic algorithms, building block hypothesis, epistasis,
population genetics, philosophy
1 Introduction
In constructing a representation (a genome-to-phenotype map and a fit-
ness function) a GA practitioner implicitly determines how fitness gets dis-
tributed over a genome set. If a GA with this representation is adaptive
then, with overwhelmingly high probability, the induced fitness distribution
has some type of “structure” that the GA is exploiting. There can be no
other reason for the GA’s performance. GAs are frequently adaptive in
practice. This entails that GA practitioners often construct representations
that induce fitness distributions with GA-exploitable structure.
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Before proceeding further, let us clarify what me mean by the word
“adaptive”: given a search problem, we say that some population based
search algorithm is adaptive if, across several runs with different random
seeds, the average fitness of the population consistently trends upwards. By
this token GAs are often adaptive in practice, whereas population based
random search is not. We refer to this feature of genetic algorithms as their
adaptive capacity.
We posit that anycoherent theory about the adaptive capacity of genetic
algorithms must consist of the following: Firstly a set of assumptions about
the way fitness commonly gets distributed via the representational choices of
GA practitioners; we call these the commonplace fitness structure assump-
tions (CFSAs). And secondly, a hypothesis about how this fitness structure
gets exploited by a GA during adaptation; we call this the exploitation hy-
pothesis (EH).
The exploitation hypothesis depends critically on the commonplace fit-
ness structure assumption, but not vice-versa. The CFSAs, in other words,
are foundational. Therefore, when developing an explanation for the adap-
tive capacity of genetic algorithms, getting the CFSAs right is extremely
important. Fundamentally flawed CFSAs thwart the entire enterprise no
matter how much effort is lavished upon the development and justification
of the EH.
Practically any EH can be justified if one starts with sufficiently strong
assumptions. To be viable an EH must be based upon CFSAs that are
weak. This is nothing but an application of the principle of Occam’s razor,
which holds that the weaker the assumptions that undergird a theory, the
more viable the theory. This principle clearly makes sense in the current
context. GA representations are completely ad-hoc. Therefore the weaker
our assumptions about the nature of the induced fitness structure, the more
likely it is that these assumptions hold true1.
The building block hypothesis (BBH) is currently the dominant expla-
1Adherents of the building block hypothesis may disagree with our assessment that
the representations they construct are “completely ad-hoc”. After all, much advice for
constructing representations has been dispensed (e.g. “ensure a large supply of building
blocks”); those who have made an effort to follow this advice may claim to have a basis for
making strong assumptions about the structure of the fitness distributions they induce.
Unfortunately claims of this nature are unjustified. While there is plenty of advice on how
representations should be constructed, there is, as far as we can tell, no principled way
for determining how this advice should be put into practice in specific instances (except
perhaps when the problems are contrived). In this respect the dispensed advice is much
like the famous investing maxim “buy low, sell high”—easy to state, hard to implement.
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nation for the adaptive capacity of simple genetic algorithms. Though this
hypothesis has come in for some (at times sharp) criticism in recent times, it
remains the compass by which the vast majority of GA practitioners—past
and present—have allowed themselves to be guided. It is also the first ex-
planation for the adaptive capacity of GAs that most students receive, and
in this capacity surely exerts an anchoring effect (Tversky and Kahneman,
1974) on their reasoning.
Previously expressed skepticism of the building block hypothesis can be
divided into two categories. The first consists of criticism of the weak the-
oretical foundations of this hypothesis (for a survey see Reeves and Rowe
2003, section 3.3). Proponents of the building block hypothesis have, for the
most, part brushed aside criticism of this sort. Goldberg, for example, calls
such critiques “[a] favorite parlor game in genetic and evolutionary compu-
tation circles”(Goldberg, 2002, p7), and, by way of analogy, characterizes
such concerns as absurd. “[T]he very idea that an airplane is ineffective or
unsafe because a formal mathematical proof of flight does not exist is itself
an absurdity.”, he writes. “Yet, if this is so—and no proof does exist of air-
plane flight—and if I . . . transform the aircraft into a genetic algorithm. . . ,
why is it that [this] patently absurd alarm seems so real in the context of
GAs and their design and use?”(Goldberg, 2002, p19).
The second category is comprised of skepticism arising from the anoma-
lous performance of the simple genetic algorithm on some basic empirical
tests (Forrest and Mitchell 1993; Watson 2006, Section 6.2). In response to
these results proponents of the building block hypothesis have downplayed
the importance of the simple genetic algorithm (Holland, 2000; Goldberg,
2002), and have advocated the use other sorts of genetic algorithms (e.g.
cohort genetic algorithms, “competent” genetic algorithms), that are more
complicated than the simple genetic algorithm, and typically contain mech-
anisms that are not biologically plausible. Strictly speaking the building
block hypothesis applies only to the simple genetic algorithm. Therefore by
downgrading the importance of the simple genetic algorithm proponents of
the building block hypothesis can claim to have rendered skepticism about
the veracity of this hypothesis irrelevant.
The skepticism expressed in this paper does not belong to either of the
two categories described above. It is, in a sense, more fundamental, stem-
ming from a critical appraisal of the strength of the CFSAs that undergird
the building block hypothesis. We examine various influences—historical,
social, and metaphysical—that have shaped these assumptions, and argue
that the resulting CFSAs are unacceptably strong. As these CFSAs have
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largely been embraced by the designers of the new types of genetic algo-
rithms mentioned in the previous paragraph, our criticism is also relevant
to an evaluation of those algorithms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly
recount the history of the building block hypothesis—its origin, ascent, and
recent troubles. In section 3 we describe the CFSAs undergirding this hy-
pothesis, and explain why we find them to be unacceptably strong. In
sections 4 and 5 we critically examine the ways in which proponents of the
building block hypothesis have sought to justify this hypothesis, and by ex-
tension, the CFSAs that undergird it. In section 6 we explain the import
of our criticism of these CFSAs for the current direction of the field of ge-
netic algorithmics. And finally as part of our conclusion, we draw parallels
between the CFSAs of the building block hypothesis, and the now defunct
concept of luminiferous aether that was popular in nineteenth century the-
ories about the propagation of light.
2 A Brief History of the BBH
Scientific theories are typically presented without reference to the context
within which they were developed (Okasha, 2002, p79). At a certain level
this of course makes sense; surely what a scientist has for breakfast is im-
material to one’s evaluation of her theories. At the same time, it has been
observed that to genuinely understand the state of a science, an acquain-
tance with its history is essential. Every scientific theory is undergirded by
what the historian of science, Thomas Kuhn, calls received beliefs (Kuhn,
p4)—assumptions transmitted from one generation to the next within a sci-
entific community. An acquaintance with the history of a science can help
one identify the origins of such assumptions and the circumstances under
which they have have been perpetuated.
2.1 Origin of the Building Block Hypothesis
In the 1960s and early ’70s Holland developed an abstract mathematical
model of adaptive processes, what he called an adaptive plan, which was
inspired by natural evolution but was of greater generality. Holland sought
to use this model to unify, under one theoretical framework, adaptation in
such diverse fields as neuroscience, economics, control, game theory, artificial
intelligence, and genetics.
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For any adaptive process that generates only valid structures of some
type, one can define a set A of all possible valid structures that may be
generated during the adaptive process. For example, in the domain of eco-
nomic planning an element of A may be a mix of goods; in game-theory A
may be the set of all strategies with respect to some game (Holland, 1975,
p4). Holland conceptualized adaptation as a process that generates samples
from A, concentrating these samples over time in subsets of A of increasing
average fitness.
The central conceptual objects in Holland’s framework are subsets of A
called schemata (singular schema). Holland noted that each point in A may
belong simultaneously to several schemata. Therefore an evaluation of the
fitness of that point is, in effect, a fitness evaluation of a sample from each
schema that the point belongs to. If the point is ‘fit’ then this reflects well
on all of those schemata, and vice-versa if the point is ‘unfit’. This obser-
vation suggested to Holland the possibility of the existence of algorithms
which, by testing small numbers of points, implicitly test vast numbers of
schemata, and then implicitly use this information to concentrate trials in
schemata of increasing average fitness. Holland named this phenomenon
intrinsic parallelism (Holland, 1975, p74), a name he later revised to im-
plicit parallelism (Holland, 1992). Holland also clearly seems to have been
impressed by the utility of hierarchical assembly (Simon, 1969, Chapter 4;
Holland, 1975, p168).
In an argument that freely mixed speculation and deduction—the line
between the two was typically left blurry—Holland concluded that a spe-
cific adaptive plan that models natural evolution—what he called a genetic
plan—can generate high-fitness solutions to difficult adaptation problems,
and that this adaptive plan will do so using implicit parallelism and hierar-
chical assembly.
Starting in 1970, Holland’s students began applying implementations
of genetic plans to adaptation problems (e.g. Cavicchio, 1970; Hollstien,
1971). They found that these algorithms typically outperformed random
search. In a landmark dissertation De Jong (1975) described experiments in
which a stripped down version of the genetic plan—what is now called the
simple genetic algorithm—was applied to a carefully contrived set of fitness
functions with well-understood and diverse characteristics. De Jong (1975)
reports that “Out of these early studies [his and those of his colleagues]
emerged a picture of a GA as a robust adaptive search procedure, which
was surprisingly effective as a global search heuristic”.
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Holland’s theoretical work on genetic plans was seen as the obvious place
to look for an explanation for the adaptive capacity of genetic algorithms.
Holland and his students simplified this work and settled upon the well
known explanation that goes by the name of the building block hypothesis
(Goldberg, 1989; Holland, 1992; Mitchell, 1996).
2.2 Initial Espousal and Recent Skepticism
Until the late 1980s the building block hypothesis seems to have gone rela-
tively unquestioned. However, with the explosive increase in the popularity
of the genetic algorithm came increasing scrutiny of its theoretical foun-
dations. Starting in the early 1990s several researchers began to publish
independent ground-up theoretical analyses of the dynamics of genetic al-
gorithms (Vose and Liepins, 1991; Nix and Vose, 1992; Vose, 1993; Pru¨gel-
Bennett and Shapiro, 1994; Rattray, 1996; Shapiro, 2001). What prompted
these entirely new lines of theoretical analysis? It is hard to say for cer-
tain, but we believe that at least part of the cause was frustration with
the unclear demarcation between conjectures and mathematically provable
facts that is characteristic of the argument of the argument for the building
block hypothesis. In the preface to his book on the simple genetic algorithm
Vose (1999) writes “My central purpose in writing this book is to provide
an introduction to what is known about the theory of the Simple Genetic
Algorithm. The rigor of mathematics is employed so as not to inadvertently
repeat myths or recount folklore”. He adds that the absence of core ele-
ments of “standard GA theory” in his book is due to the unintelligibility,
the irrelevance, or the mathematical unjustifyability of these elements. In
a later work Wright et. al. (2003) remark, “The various claims about GAs
that are traditionally made under the name of the building block hypothesis
have, to date, no basis in theory”.
Statements like these have served a vital purpose. Despite its name,
the building block hypothesis had come to be treated as much more than
a hypothesis. It had become the de-facto explanation for the success of ge-
netic algorithms, thoroughly shaping the paradigm within which most GA
research was conducted. For example, this hypothesis determined what con-
stituted a valid question, a valid explanation, a valid prediction, and a valid
enhancement of some genetic algorithm. Given the assertive tone in which
the building block used to be presented (see Goldberg, 1989; Holland, 1992),
and the blurry line between deductive reasoning and conjecture in the ar-
gument for this hypothesis, students and non-theoreticians who were eager
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for an explanation cannot not be blamed for surmising that the building
block hypothesis is based largely on deductive reasoning. Statements such
as the ones reproduced above now serve to caution them against this no-
tion. These statements have also served as a call to apologists to clearly
describe their premises and modes of reasoning. The responses elicited (e.g.
Holland, 2000; Goldberg, 2002), provide us with the clearest picture yet of
the presumptions undergirding the building block hypothesis.
3 The CFSAs of the BBH
Let us quickly recount some basic elements of schema theory. In the case
of genetic algorithms, A is the set of all strings of some predetermined
length drawn from some alphabet (in what follows we assume that this
alphabet is {0,1}). Let us call the elements of this set genomes. Schemata
are represented by so called ‘similarity templates’. Suppose A is a set of
strings of length 6, then the schema 1*0**0 is the subset of strings in A
with 1 in the first position, zero in the third and sixth positions, and either
1 or 0 in the second, fourth, and fifth positions; the *, called a ‘wildcard’,
stands for ‘don’t care’. For the sake of brevity, a schema template is often
just called a schema. It is important though to keep in mind the distinction
between the two. Given some population, the frequency of a schema is the
number of genomes in the population that belong to that schema. A defining
position of a schema is a position that is not a wildcard. The defining length
of a schema is the difference between the indices of the last and first defining
positions. Finally, the order of a schema is the number of defining positions.
Thus, the defining length and order of the schema in the example above are
five and three respectively. A schema with low defining-length (and therefore
low order) is said to be ‘short’.
Let S1 and S2 be two subsets of A. For a population of size N , let us
say that the sampling fitness of S1 is likely to be greater than (or less than)
the sampling fitness of S2 if there is a high probability that the average
fitness of |S1||A|N samples drawn uniformly from S1 will be greater than (or,
respectively, less than) the average fitness of |S2||A|N samples drawn uniformly
from S2.
Given some collection of subsets of A with a non-empty intersection, we
say that the intersection is consonant (Figure 1a) if the sampling fitness of
the intersection is not likely to be greater than or less than the sampling
fitness of any of the intersecting subsets. We say that the intersection is
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antagonistic (Figure 1b) if the sampling fitness of the intersection is likely
to be less than the sampling fitness values of all the intersecting subsets.
And we say that the intersection is synergistic (Figure 1c) if the sampling
fitness of the intersection is likely to be greater than the sampling fitness
values of all the intersecting subsets.
We define a basic building block to be a short schema with sampling
fitness that is likely to be greater than the uniform sampling fitness of A. A
synergistic intersection between a small collection of basic building blocks is
called a 2nd level building block, a synergistic intersection between a small
collection of 2nd level building blocks is called a 3rd level building block,
and so on. The building block hypothesis rests on (at the very least) the
following two CFSAs:
Abundant Basic Building Blocks: A large number of basic building blocks
exist.
Heirarchical Synergism: Antagonistic intersections between the building
blocks of any level are rare, whereas synergistic intersections between
small collections of lower level building blocks are common.
It seems to us that the number of ways in which these assumptions can
be satisfied is vastly outnumbered by the number of ways in which they will
not be satisfied. We trust that the reader, upon seeing these assumptions
explicitly laid out, will agree that they are unacceptably strong. Remember
that we are talking about the structure of fitness functions induced by the
ad-hoc decisions of GA practitioners engaged in solving poorly understood,
or NP-hard problems.
In the following sections we examine two ways in which proponents of
the building block hypothesis have attempted to justify their belief in these
assumptions—an appeal to certain metaphysical positions, and an appeal
to authority.
4 Appeal to Metaphysical Positions
In support of the building block hypothesis Holland has asserted the building
block thesis. He describes this thesis as follows: ‘The “building block thesis”
holds that most of what we know about the world pivots on descriptions and
mechanisms constructed from elementary building blocks’. He characterizes
building blocks as “parts” such that “(i) they must be easy to identify (once
8
(a) A consonant intersection between two subsets
(b) An antagonistic intersection between two subsets
(c) A synergistic intersection between two subsets
Figure 1: A consonant, antagonistic, and synergistic intersection between
two subsets is depicted. Darker shades signify greater sampling fitness
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they’ve been discovered or picked out), and (ii) they must be readily re-
combined to form a wide variety of structures (much as can be done with
children’s building blocks)”.
The way this Building block thesis is phrased it is a statement about
what is already known about the world rather than a universal law, which
is how Holland goes on to use it. Our most sympathetic rephrasing of the
building block thesis in light of the way Holland uses it to support the
building block hypothesisis is as follows: Building blocks play a key role in
the structure and function of most objects and processes. Building blocks
are (i) parts of wholes, (ii) easily identifiable, and (iii) recombinable with
other building blocks to form a wide variety of forms. It is necessary to
quote Holland at length so as not to leave out any part of his argument for
this thesis. Holland writes
‘The successive levels of building blocks used in physics are famil-
iar to anyone interested in science—nucleons constructed from
quarks, nuclei constructed from nucleons, atoms constructed from
nuclei, molecules constructed from atoms, and so on . . . Nowadays
a similar succession presents itself in daily newspaper articles dis-
cussing progress in biology: chromosomal DNA constructed from
4 nucleotide building blocks; the basic structural components of
enzymes: alpha helices, beta sheets, and the like, constructed
from 20 amino acids; standard “signalling” proteins for turn-
ing genes “on” and “off,” ad “autocatalytic bio-circuits,” such
as the citric acid cycle, that perform similar functions over ex-
traordinarily wide ranges of species organelles constructed from
situated bio-circuits, and so on . . . And, of course, there are the
long-standing taxonomic categories: species, genus, family, etc.,
specified in terms of morphological and chromosomal building
blocks held in common. However the pervasiveness of building
blocks only becomes apparent when we start looking at other
areas of human endeavor. In some cases we take building blocks
so much for granted that we’re not even aware of them. Human
perception is a case in point. The objects we recognize in the
world are always defined in terms of elementary, reusable build-
ing blocks, be they trees (leaves, branches, trunks, . . . ), horses
(legs, body, neck, head, blunt teeth, . . . ), speech(a limited set
of basic sounds called phonemes), or written language (the 26
letters of English, for example).
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‘In other cases we just don’t make the building blocks explicit.
Consider two major inventions of the 20th century, the internal
combustion engine and the electronic computer. The building
blocks of the internal combustion engine: gears, Venturi’s aspira-
tor, Galvani’s sparking device, and so on, were well-known prior
to the invention. The invention consisted in combining them in
a new way. Similarly, the components of early electronic pro-
grammable computers: wires, Geiger’s counting device, cathode
ray tubes, and the like, were well-known. Even earlier, Babbage
had spelled out an overall architecture using long-standard, me-
chanical building blocks, (gears, ratchets, levers, etc.). The latter
invention consisted in combining the electronic building blocks
in a way that implemented Babbage’s mechanical layout. And,
of course, building blocks underpin the critical step for universal
computation: arbitrary algorithms are constructed by combin-
ing copies of a small set of basic instructions. For both the in-
ternal combustion engine and the programmable computer, the
building blocks were a necessary precursor, but the innovation
required a new combination of the blocks’ (Holland, 2000).
Holland (2000) regards the schema theorem as the Rosetta stone that
shows how the building block thesis applies to genetic algorithms. This
theorem shows that if a short schema with frequency x has above average
fitness in some generation t, then the expected frequency of that schema
in generation t + 1 is greater than x. From this result proponents of the
building block hypothesis conclude that short schemata with above average
fitness are the basic building blocks that genetic algorithms implicitly use.
That such building blocks must “therefore” be abundant and hierarchically
synergistic presumably “follows” from the building block thesis.
We trust that the reader will agree that the building block thesis is too
vague to be falsifiable. Firstly, it uses highly subjective language. The stip-
ulations that building blocks be “easy” to identify and “recombinable” beg
the question “according to whom?”. Secondly, the use of the word “most”
makes this thesis impossible to falsify unless one conducts an inventory of
all entities in the universe.
The falsifiability criterion was formulated by the philosopher of science
Karl Popper (2007b; 2007a) as a way to distinguish between scientific theo-
ries, such as Einstein’s theory of gravitation, and pseudo-scientific theories,
such as astrology, or Freud’s theory of psycho-analysis. Pseudo-scientific
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theories, noted Popper,
“appeared to be able to explain practically everything that hap-
pened within the fields to which they referred. The study of any
of them seemed to have the effect of an intellectual conversion or
revelation, opening your eyes to a new truth hidden from those
not yet initiated. Once your eyes were thus opened you saw con-
firming instances everywhere: the world was full of verifications
of the theory. Whatever happened always confirmed it. Thus its
truth appeared manifest and unbelievers were clearly people who
did not want to see the manifest truth”(Popper, 2007a, p45).
Scientific theories, in contrast, are theories that take risks—by predicting
unexpected phenomena (e.g. gravitational lensing) they leave themselves
open to refutation. “A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable
event is non-scientific”, wrote Popper. “Irrefutability is not a virtue (as
people often think) but a vice”(Popper, 2007a, p46).
Consider for example the difference between the Church-Turing thesis
(Copeland, 2004), a refutable and therefore scientific thesis, and the building
block “thesis”, which is neither. The most generous way to regard the
building block “thesis” is as a metaphysical theory of pan-modularity and
pan-hierarchism. Should this new way of regarding Holland’s “thesis” allay
our concerns about the building block hypothesis? It should not. Indeed
any hypothesis can be justified by first asserting a generalization of the
hypothesis as a new metaphysical position, and then using the metaphysical
position to argue in favor of the specific hypothesis.
5 Appeal to Authority
It is clear from his writings that Holland views the building block hypothesis
as a straightforward generalization of Fisher’s theory of adaption (1975,
p89; 2000)—a generalization indeed that, to Holland’s mind, rests on much
weaker assumptions than Fisher’s. Fisher’s theory currently reigns as the
orthodox view in Population Genetics, so it is understandable that Holland
finds it exasperating that the building block hypothesis should meet with
the kind of criticism it has received from certain quarters within the genetic
algorithmics community (see Holland, 2000).
In this section we describe some of Fisher’s assumptions, highlight their
extraordinary strength, and examine the circumstances under which these
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assumptions became part of the orthodoxy of Population Genetics. It is
important to stress that the adoption of Fisher’s assumptions by population
geneticists, though pervasive, is by no means unanimous. Accordingly, we
will review some of the criticism that has been leveled at these assumptions.
Finally we compare Holland’s assumptions with Fisher’s. We argue that the
extent by which the former are weaker than the latter has been exaggerated,
and explain how Holland’s assumptions are in fact stronger than Fisher’s in
an important respect.
5.1 The Fisherian Pardigm and its Discontents
For almost two decades after the discovery, in 1900, of his paper on inheri-
tance in pea plants, Mendel’s theory of particulate inheritance was thought
to be at odds with the theory of adaptation by natural selection proposed by
Darwin and Wallace. The mendelians argued that new species arise not by
gradual changes, but by large jumps—called saltations—caused by macro-
mutations. Such mutations (which were assumed to occur infrequently) were
thought to be the main drivers of adaptation. Natural selection on the other
hand was thought to play at best a minor part—that of mopping up dele-
terious macromutations. Though this point of view was never articulated
by Mendel himself, his name became associated with researchers such as
DeVries, Bateson and Johansen who used the results of Mendel’s paper to
downplay the effects of natural selection (p 777 Mayr).
Opposing them, the biometricians (e.g. Pearson, and Weldon) noted
that gradualness abounds in nature, and argued that evolution consists of a
gradual shift of an entire population rather than the creation of new types by
macromutation. The biometricians made extensive use of statistics to study
the effect of natural selection on phenotypic distributions and claimed supe-
riority over the mendelians on account of their commitment to mathematical
rigor (the mendelians in turn trumpeted their fidelity to empiricism). By
and large the biometricians rejected mendelian inheritance (Provine, 2001,
p85). This may seem odd in this day and age, but remember that we are
discussing a time that predates the discovery of the material basis of in-
heritance (chromosomes comprised of DNA), as well as the mechanism of
inheritance (meiosis).
The possibility of reconciling the views of the mendelians with those of
the biometricians had been considered by Yule, and Parson as early as 1902.
However it is Fisher’s paper, published in 1918, on “The correlation of rel-
atives on the supposition of Mendelian inheritance” that is widely regarded
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as marking the beginning of the synthesis of these two purportedly irrec-
oncilable theories into a single theory of evolution—what we now call the
modern synthesis.
In this paper, Fisher, himself an eminent statistician, presented a math-
ematical model that incorporated natural selection and mendelian inheri-
tance, and used it, amongst other things, to calculate correlations between
certain traits in relatives. He argued that his model could account for pub-
lished biometric data (Pearson and Lee, 1903) which Pearson (a biometri-
cian) had previously used to question the adequacy of Mendelian inheritance.
Fisher’s use of Pearson’s own data to challenge Pearson’s position was
seen as a coup d’e´tat of sorts. Provine (2001, p147) reports that “Fisher’s
1918 paper was well received by the few geneticists who could understand
his mathematics”. At any rate, there seems to have been no alarm over
the remarkably strong assumptions undergirding Fisher’s work. What were
these assumptions?
In Fisher’s model a quantitative trait (e.g. stature, i.e. height) is un-
der the influence of multiple genes, each with multiple allelic instantiations.
Fisher assumed that the effects of allele substitutions in an individual were
constant and combined additively. This assumption entails that the substi-
tution of one allele for another always has the same additive effect on the
value of the trait, regardless of the genetic background in which the allele
substitution occurs. To be fair Fisher did discuss the possibility that the
effects of gene substitutions might not combine additively. He called this
condition epistacy, a term he later revised to epistasis. Early in the paper
Fisher urged his readers to treat epistasis and the effects of the environment
as one might regard “an arbitrary error introduced into the measurements”,
in other words, as noise. Later he returned to show how the case when epis-
tasis is not well modeled by noise might be dealt with. Unfortunately, his
treatment is rather incomplete; he limited himself to addressing “deviations
from linearity as may exist between two factors”, but not more, because
(amongst other things) he deemed such higher order deviations “improba-
ble”.
Importantly, considerations of epistasis did not figure into Fisher’s ac-
counting for the biometric data of Pearson and Lee. Fisher, in other words,
accounted for this data while making extremely strong assumptions about
the effects of allele substitutions. Nevertheless, he firmly believed that his
approach was valid. In the conclusion of the paper he wrote:
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“Throughout this work it has been necessary not to include any
avoidable complications, and for this reason the possibilities of
Epistacy have only been touched upon, and small quantities of
the second order have been steadily ignored. In spite of this, it is
believed that the statistical properties of any features determined
by a large number of Mendelian factors have been successfully
elucidated”.
Fisher’s characterization of epistasis as an “avoidable complication” to
his theory betrays a confusion about the role of parsimony in scientific the-
orizing. He seems to have believed that a simpler explanation is to be
preferred to a more complicated one. Occam’s razor, or the principle of par-
simony, however applies to the assumptions undergirding an explanation,
and not to the deductive chains of logic based upon these assumptions. To
see this clearly, note that any phenomenon can be explained by the simple
statement “God wills it”. The appeal of scientific theories lies, certainly not
in their comparative succinctness (scientific explanations are always longer),
but in the comparative parsimony of the assumptions involved.
As mentioned above, the extraordinary strength of Fisher’s assumptions
drew no protest at the time. Encouraged by the reception of his paper,
Fisher continued with his particular mode of analysis (Provine, 2001, p147).
In his highly influential book “The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection”,
in which he set Darwin’s theory of natural selection on a Mendelian foun-
dation, Fisher (1930) gave short shrift to epistasis. This time however his
assumptions were criticized by Sewall Wright who, based on years of ex-
perimental work, was convinced of the error of assigning fitness effects to
individual genes. In a review of Fisher’s book Wright remarked that the
Fisherian approach
“assumes that each gene is assigned a constant value, measuring
its contribution to the character of the individual (here fitness)
in such a way that the sums of the contributions of all genes will
equal as closely as possible the actual measures of the charac-
ter in the individuals of the population. Obviously there could
be exact agreement in all cases only if dominance and epistatic
relationships were completely lacking. . . . [W]ith respect to such
a character as fitness, it may safely be assumed that there are
always important epistatic effects. Genes favorable in one com-
bination, are, for example extremely likely to be unfavorable in
another.”(Wright, 1930)
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Wright’s protests notwithstanding, the assumption that the fitness ef-
fects of gene substitutions are independent of the genetic background in
which they occur has become the orthodoxy in population genetics. This
position is described on the first page of a popular introductory textbook as
follows:
“Population geneticists have achieved remarkable success by choos-
ing to ignore the complexities of real populations and focusing
on the evolution of one or a few loci at a time. . . . The success
of this approach, which has been seen in both theoretical and
experimental investigations has been impressive, as I hope the
reader will agree by the end of this book. The approach is not
without its detractors. Years ago, Ernst Mayr mocked this ap-
proach as ‘bean bag genetics.’ In so doing, he echoed a view held
by many of the pioneers of our field that natural selection acts
on highly interactive coadapted genomes whose evolution cannot
be understood by considering the evolution of a few loci in isola-
tion from all others. Although genomes are certainly coadapted,
there is precious little evidence that there are strong interactions
between most polymorphic alleles in natural populations. The
modern view, spurred on by the rush of DNA sequence data, is
that we can profitably study loci in isolation.”(Gillespie, 1998)
This “modern view” is challenged by a small, but outspoken community
of critics, who consider the practice of theoretically analyzing isolated loci
to be driven by convenience and scandalously naive; see, for example, the
volume by Wolf et. al (2000). Consider the following passage from this
compilation which accounts for Gillespie’s observation that “there is precious
little evidence that there are strong interactions between most polymorphic
alleles in natural populations”. Paraphrasing statements made by Frankel
and Shork (1996), Templeton writes:
“The subjective assessment of Frankel and Shork (1996) implies
that epistasis is common, despite the numerous biases that ex-
ist against its detection. Frankel and Shork (1996) point out
that the primary reason why many complex traits are not re-
ported to have epistasis is simply that many investigators use
designs and/or analytical methods that exclude epistasis. The
implicit assumption in these analyses is that all the biologi-
cally important associations are to be found at the single-locus
level.”(Templeton, 2000)
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Later in the same paper, Templeton cautions that the pervasiveness of
this “implicit assumption” amounts to a community-wide neglect of epistasis
because of the mathematical and statistical inconvenience it poses.
“The dominance of this research paradigm has more to do with
mathematical and statistical convenience than with biological re-
ality. All that we know of biological systems—from the control of
gene expression, to biochemical pathways, to developmental pro-
cesses, to physiological regulation—indicates that interactions
are the norm.” (Templeton, 2000)
Meanwhile Rice has argued that the very notion of epistasis is question-
able. Not because epistasis does not exist, but because it is ubiquitous.
“ ‘Epistasis,’ like ‘invertebrate,’ is a term that really means ‘ev-
erything else’. Traditionally defined as a situation in which the
consequences of an allele substitution at one locus are a function
of what allele is present at another locus . . . , epistasis includes
all possible ways that gene products can conspire to shape a phe-
notype, with the very unlikely exception of complete additivity.
To name a phenomenon in this way has the curious effect of
making it look like a special case, even if it is the most common
situation.”(Rice, 2000)
5.2 Comparing Fisher’s Assumptions with Holland’s
Proponents of the building block hypothesis typically regard each symbol in
a genomic string as a separate gene (Holland, 1975; Goldberg, 1989; Mitchell,
1996). A building block can then be (incompletely) described as a small set
of closely located genes amongst which credit cannot be apportioned, i.e. a
set of genes with epistatic interactions. As building blocks are assumed to
be abundant, proponents of the building block hypothesis feel justified in
claiming that the building block hypothesis accommodates the existence of
pervasive epistasis, and therefore rests on assumptions that are much weaker
than Fisher’s.
A less cozy picture however emerges if one defines a gene more in line
with its definition in population genetics. The word “gene” was coined by
the Danish geneticist Wilhelm Johansen in 1909, at a time when the partic-
ulate nature of inheritance could only be surmised by observing differences
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between generations of phenotypes. Johansen used the word gene to stand
for a unit of inheritance passed on from parent to child in an all-or-nothing
fashion. The theories of the founders of population genetics—Fisher, Wright,
Haldane—all make use of these fictitious units. Later, as the physical basis
of inheritance started to become clear, molecular biologists began to iden-
tify a gene with any regulatory, transcribed, and/or other functional region
of DNA. Unfortunately this use of the term “gene” is not consistent with
its use in population genetics. In order to maintain consistency with the
theoretical work of their field’s founders, population geneticists typically
identify a gene with a chromosomal extent that tends to be inherited in an
all-or-nothing fashion, i.e. a chromosomal extent that is short enough that
it tends not to be broken up by crossover (Dawkins, 1999, p28). This is not
a strict definition, like say that of a triangle, but instead has a “fading-out”
quality that is contingent upon the expected number of crossover points and
the way they tend to be distributed over the genome2.
If we focus on GAs with n-point crossover where n is small, then in
light of the above, any short schema with contiguous defining positions is
a gene. Given this definition of a gene, note that any building block must
be comprised of one or more genes with above average fitness. For example,
if ****************10*1*** is a building block, then one or both of the
genes ****************1001***, and ****************1011*** must have
above average fitness. Given the above it is easy to see how the building
block hypothesis and the assumptions that undergird it can be described
entirely in terms of genes. Taking this perspective allows us to compare
Fisher’s assumptions with those of Holland.
Both Fisher and Holland assumed the existence of a large number of
genes with higher than average fitness. Fisher essentially assumed that
any collection of such genes intersects synergistically. Holland, assumed
a) that synergistic intersections between small collections of such genes is
common, b) that antagonistic intersections between any collection of such
genes is rare, and c) that this pattern applies hierarchically. To be sure these
three assumptions about the distribution of fitness are weaker than Fisher’s.
However, given the extraordinary strength of Fisher’s assumptions, that’s
not saying much.
Fisher and Holland also differ in the way they deal with the problem
of sampling error. By assuming an infinite panmictic (i.e. fully mixing)
2Dawkins uses the word cistron to refer to what molecular biologists call a gene
(Dawkins, 1999, p28).
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population, Fisher dispensed with the need for the average fitness values
of the alleles of each gene to be significantly different. This is because in
an infinite panmictic population evolution can act on differences between
these values no matter how small the differences. In other words, by making
a strong assumption about the size of the evolving population Fisher was
able to avoid making a strong assumption about the distribution of fitness.
Because GAs used in practice tend to have small populations—typically no
more than 1000 individuals—an escape of this sort is clearly not available
to genetic algorithm theorists
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge the issue of sampling error
has not been addressed by proponents of the building block hypothesis. By
insisting that the building block hypothesis explains the adaptive capac-
ity of GAs with small populations, and by making no effort to address the
issue of sampling error that arises when one takes this position, these pro-
ponents are, in effect, making the assumption that each basic building block
is comprised of at least one gene whose sampling fitness is likely to be so far
above average that evolution will propagate this gene despite the inevitable
sampling error that accompanies the evolution of small populations. The as-
sumption that basic building blocks are abundant entails the extraordinarily
strong assumption that the genes that comprise them are also abundant.
6 The Problem with the Loose Linkage “Problem”
While proponents of the building block hypothesis seem to be comfortable
with the strong assumption that low-order schemata with above average
sampling fitness are abundant, they are less enthusiastic about assuming
abundance when it is also stipulated that the schemata must be short. In
other words, these proponents are uncomfortable assuming that the defining
positions of basic building blocks are “tightly linked”, i.e. close together.
Their wariness about this assumption can be traced back to Holland’s
contention in his seminal treatise (Holland, 1975) that the defining bits of
building blocks may well be dispersed throughout the genome (i.e. loosely
linked). Holland considered this to be a significant problem. To deal with
it he introduced the inversion operator which reverses the order of the bits
of a randomly chosen snippet of a genome while preserving the genome’s
semantics (Holland, 1975, p106). Holland asserted that over several gener-
ations inversion, in combination with crossover and selection, will tighten
the linkage between the defining positions of schemata with above average
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fitness in an “intrinsically parallel fashion”(Holland, 1975, p109).
The inversion operator was not found to be useful in practice (Davis,
1991), and the study of inversion did not become an active area of research.
However, the loose linkage problem that inversion was supposed to solve
took on a life of its own—it became a de facto explanation for poor GA per-
formance, and has captured the attention and creative energies of a sizeable
section of the GA community. A large number of algorithms with explicit
“linkage learning” schemes have been developed to deal with this perceived
problem e.g. mGA and the fmGA (Goldberg et al., 1989, 1990, 1993; Kar-
gupta, 1995), gemGA, (Kargupta, 1996; Goldberg, 2002), LLGA (Harik and
Goldberg, 1997; Goldberg, 2002), ECGA (Harik, 1999), FDA (Mu¨hlenbein
and Mahnig, 1999), LFDA (Mu¨hlenbein and Mahnig, 2001), BOA (Pelikan
et al., 1999; Goldberg, 2002), hBOA (Pelikan and Goldberg, 2001), SEAM
(Watson, 2002, 2006).
What seems to have been overlooked in this flurry of activity is that the
assumption of tight linkage between the defining positions of basic building
blocks is just one of a number of strong assumptions undergirding the build-
ing block hypothesis. Consciously or otherwise, these other assumptions—
the abundance of basic building blocks, and hierarchical synergism—have
been embraced by the inventors of the algorithms listed above.
Goldberg (2002) calls such algorithms “competent” GAs. The impli-
cation, of course, is that the simple genetic algorithm, which lacks explicit
linkage learning mechanisms, is incompetent. Driving home this point Gold-
berg writes:
“One mistaken idea that has led to controversy is the idea that
simple GAs as originally designed (De Jong, 1975) or their minor
variants achieve the kind of robustness sought in Holland’s early
writing. This text puts this canard to rest; even my first text
[(Goldberg, 1989)] went to great lengths to discuss the impor-
tance of linkage and the inadequacy of simple GAs in solving the
linkage problem. Nonetheless, the field has proceeded using sim-
ple GAs as though they worked well. They do not.”(Goldberg,
2002, p55)
Sadly, Goldberg does not consider the possibility that simple GAs and minor
variants thereof continue to be used by GA practitioners because they do
“work well”, but don’t work as described in the building block hypothesis.
An unfortunate consequence of the field’s preoccupation with the loose
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linkage “problem” is the diversion of effort that might otherwise have been
devoted to developing more viable explanations for the adaptive capacity of
the simple genetic algorithm. Why, after all, would an engineer care to study
the workings of an algorithm deemed the poor cousin of more “competent”
algorithms?
7 Conclusion
What is a genetic algorithm? Is it
(a) An algorithmic model of natural evolution in which selection, crossover,
and mutation are iteratively applied to a population of strings, or
(b) An algorithm that implements the process described in the building
block hypothesis
Proponents of the building block hypothesis regard both (a) and (b) as valid
descriptions of a genetic algorithm. However, of the two descriptions, their
loyalty seems to reside with description (b). Holland, for example, writes
“the very essence of good GA design is retention of diversity, furthering
exploration, while exploiting building blocks already discovered”3 Most re-
searchers in the field however readily agree with description (a), but need to
be convinced that (b) is also a valid description. The theoretical basis of the
argument by which BBH proponents attempt to convince us of the validity
of description (b) has been sharply criticized. Unfortunately criticism of this
sort has been brushed aside by BBH proponents who continue to insist that
(b) is a valid description.
“What is it that people do when they are being innovative in a cross-
fertilizing sense?”, asks Goldberg. “Usually they are grasping at a notion—
a set of good solution features—in one context, and a notion in another
context and juxtaposing them, thereby speculating that the combination
might be better than either notion taken individually” (Goldberg, 2002,
p5). Goldberg calls the attribution to genetic algorithms of this purported
process of human innovation the fundamental intuition of genetic algorithms.
One of the ways in which he attempts to justify this de facto attribution is by
reproducing a quote by the French Mathematician Jacques Hadamard, from
3One has to wonder if the building block hypothesis can really be called a hypothesis
if essential parts of it are incorporated into the definition of a GA.
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a book entitled “The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field”
: “Indeed, it is obvious that invention or discovery be it in mathematics or
anywhere else, takes place by combining ideas”.
No one can deny the aesthetic appeal of the building block hypothesis—
least of all computer scientists, weaned (as we typically are) on the virtues
and use of modularity. That genetic algorithms might be constructing so-
lutions to problems much as we do—by identifying important modules, and
composing them together—is a truly exciting prospect. Unfortunately, as
discussed in this paper, some extraordinarily strong assumptions about the
distribution of fitness have to hold true in order for this prospect to be
realized.
The history of science is replete with conceptual entities that were highly
popular for a while, but were later jettisoned because of the extraordinary
strength of the assumptions one had to embrace. One such entity is the
luminiferous (i.e. light bearing) aether, which, for much of the nineteenth
century was assumed to be the medium through which light traveled. Light,
like all waves, bends around objects (diffraction), changes direction upon
striking a reflective surface (reflection) or entering a new medium (refrac-
tion), can be split into components with different frequencies (dispersion),
and displays interference patterns. Physicists in the nineteenth century as-
sumed that the propagation of light, like the propagation of all waves known
at the time, requires the mechanical disturbance of some physical medium.
This medium was called luminiferous aether.
On the one hand the concept of luminiferous aether proved very use-
ful because it allowed physicists to account for phenomena like diffraction
which presented serious problems for a corpuscular theory of light; on the
other hand this concept presented some serious difficulties of its own. For
example, the aether had to be extremely rigid in order to support the high
frequencies of light. At the same time, because it did not seem to have
any observable effect on the orbits of the planets, it had to be devoid of
mass and viscosity! Paradoxes like these occupied the minds of some of the
finest physicists during the latter half of nineteenth century and into the
early twentieth. Ultimately, the existence of the aether was obviated by the
less presumptive theories of Maxwell (who cast light as a electromagnetic
wave, not dependent on the mechanical properties of an aether), and Ein-
stein (specifically his work on wave-particle duality and special relativity).
The luminiferous aether, in other words, fell to Occam’s razor.
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Will building blocks go the way of luminiferous aether? Time will tell.
At this point what we can say is that certain parallels between the two
are unmistakeable. Both are the result of extrapolation—of the mechanical
basis of wave propagation in the second case, and of the purported process
underlying human innovation in the first—and both require believers to
embrace, whether consciously or otherwise, assumptions so strong that they
seem almost magical.
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